PrologueFebruary 12, 1990
Monday, February 12, 1990. In the brokerage halls of Taipei, the weighted index touched 12,682 points intraday — the highest number in the history of the Taiwan stock market, and a level nobody would reach again for thirty years.
The previous Saturday's close, 12,495.34, was already a record. On Monday the market pushed higher still, touching 12,682 in the session. People in the halls embraced and cheered. Nobody knew it was the last cheer.[3]
Eight months later, the index stood at 2,485 — down about 80 percent. In a single summer, an island's wealth had evaporated by four-fifths. The year ended at 4,530.16 — still down more than half for the year.[3]
This is not the story of a candlestick chart. It is the story of an era: the years when Taiwan was drowning in money, when everyone bought stocks, and how one island took thirty years to climb back over the number it reached that day. After 12,682, Taiwan spent thirty years learning one thing: the numbers that rise will come back, but the years lost to them will not.
Chapter OneMoney Up to the Ankles
In the mid-1980s, Taiwan's exports boomed, the trade surplus piled up, and the New Taiwan dollar rose from around 40 to around 26 to the US dollar. Hot money flooded in. On July 15, 1987, martial law was lifted, capital controls loosened, and the money began looking for an exit of its own.[7]
The stock market became the exit. In 1987 the weighted index stood at about 2,332 points; in 1988 it broke 4,000; in 1989 it surged to 9,849. In three years it had more than quadrupled. In February 1987, TSMC was founded — still unlisted, and nobody knew that thirty years later this company would carry the whole index on its back.[2][9]
Factory owners, market-stall vendors, schoolteachers, retired civil servants — the whole island talked about stocks. Queues formed outside brokerage offices to open accounts; the trading halls were packed; even taxi drivers quoted tips. Money was too plentiful and had too few places to go: property, stocks, underground investment schemes — money spilled everywhere like water. At the end of 1989, the Hongyuan underground investment house collapsed in a run, shaking the island. The places money went were already starting to go wrong.
The brokerage hall became a second living room. Before the morning open, queues already formed at the door; after the close, people stayed on, swapping tips. The halls had air conditioning, tea, and a television wall; elderly regulars brought lunch boxes and sat the whole day. A stock was more than a piece of paper — it was the social currency of the era. The first thing people said when they met was not "have you eaten," but "what did you buy today?"
"Taiwan's money is up to its ankles" was the catchphrase of those years. Money ankle-deep means more than you know what to do with. But money is like water: everyone cheers while it rises, and only when it recedes do you see who has no shoes on.
Chapter TwoThe Securities Tax Fiasco
On September 24, 1988, Finance Minister Shirley Kuo announced that profits from share trading would be taxed from the following year. Her reasoning was sound enough — why should money made from speculation escape tax? She was the first woman to sit in a cabinet of the Republic of China, and she had held the post barely two months when the problem landed on her desk.[3][6]
The market answered with nineteen consecutive limit-down sessions: every morning the market opened at the daily limit, sell orders queued and went unfilled. Under the daily price limit, panic does not fall in a day. It falls for nineteen days, one day at a time — those who wanted to run could not run, and those who did not want to run began to want to.
The tax was watered down again and again, then abandoned. Kuo left the ministry on June 1, 1990. But the market had learned something else: one sentence from the government could freeze selling for nineteen days. Institutions amplify emotion — the price limit was designed to calm the market, but it gave panic nineteen days to ferment.[3]
The 1988 episode did not kill the bull market. The index consolidated, then climbed again, reaching 9,849 in 1989. Panic came fast and left fast. People remembered that "it comes back after a fall" and forgot to ask "what brings it back." The lesson of 1988 was washed away by the rally of 1989. That is what bubbles do best: one rebound erases one warning.
Kuo's dilemma was the dilemma of every finance minister: taxes must be fair, and markets must stay alive — and the two collide, with no answer that satisfies both. She chose fairness; the market chose panic. Two years later, the tax was gone, and so was she. What remained was the question: can fairness and vitality ever be had at once?
Chapter ThreeTen Thousand Points
In early 1990, the index crossed ten thousand points. The whole island settled into a collective certainty: stocks only go up. The mood in the brokerage halls was no longer speculation; it was faith. Doubters were dismissed as people who did not understand the market; those holding cash were treated as fools.
Margin finance ran through a single institution: the Fuh-Hwa Securities Finance Corporation was the sole provider of margin lending — one channel for borrowed money, but everyone borrowed anyway. Grey-market lenders, underground loan sharks, loans from friends and family: leverage was everywhere. Borrowers believed one thing: if it rises fast enough, the interest does not matter.[3]
The market was primitive in structure: few listed companies, concentrated holdings, small floats — a handful of players could send a single stock soaring. Limit-up was routine; limit-down was a surprise. The smaller a market, the louder the echo of its mood: a few voices shouting "buy" and the whole island hears it.
Above ten thousand points, even cautious people began to doubt themselves: was not buying the real mistake? That doubt is more frightening than greed. Greed chases prices higher; doubt surrenders judgement. When the whole island believes the same thing, the belief itself becomes part of the rally.
On December 29, 1989, Japan's Nikkei closed at 38,915, its all-time high — the neighbour across the sea had reached the summit one step earlier. In 1990, Japan's bubble began to burst. Taiwan's investors barely glanced at their neighbour. Someone else's crash is always someone else's business.[8]
Chapter FourThe Crash
February 12, 1990: 12,682 points. Then the long slide down. In October, the index fell to 2,485 — about 80 percent below the peak. In eight months, one million dollars became two hundred thousand.[3]
Behind the fall was the central bank's tightening. To mop up hot money, the bank raised rates repeatedly from 1988: the rediscount rate climbed from 4.5 percent to 7.75 percent by August 1989, required reserve ratios rose by four percentage points, and selective credit controls locked down lending for property and share purchases. The sluice gates closed; the market's water level fell with them.[3]
The price limit became an amplifier once more: limit-down meant no selling, margin accounts were liquidated, and liquidations pressed out fresh limit-downs. The script of the 1988 tax fiasco played again, except this time there was no way back. Leverage is an accelerator on the way up and a mincer on the way down — the same machine, reversed, with opposite results.
1990 was also a year of upheaval in the world: Germany reunified on October 3, and Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2. But for Taiwan's investors, the year held only one thing: 12,682 points, and the 12,682 points that would never come back.
Chapter FiveThirty Years

The 12,682 peak stood like a mountain in front of the Taiwan market for thirty years. The dot-com bust of 2000, the financial crisis of 2008 — the index approached several times and never climbed over. Those who bought at the 1990 peak waited thirty years to break even — and that is before dividends and inflation.[2][10]
Over those thirty years, the market slowly grew up. Foreign institutions were admitted to invest directly from 1991. TSMC listed in 1994. Futures, options, and ETFs arrived one by one. The daily price limit was widened to 10 percent. The market was no longer a small pond where a few players stirred the water; it had become a deep market, with foreign investors and institutions of its own.[3][9]
On July 27, 2020, the index closed at 12,588 — the first close above the February 10, 1990 closing high of 12,495. The intraday high that day, 12,686, was the first to pass 12,682. Thirty years. A full generation.[10]
It took thirty years to climb back, and not with the same stocks. Most of the high-flyers of 1990 are gone. The new peak was carried by a different set of companies — semiconductors and electronics manufacturing, a completely different Taiwan. The index came back, but everything inside it had changed.
Over those thirty years, Taiwan itself changed beyond recognition: from export processing to a semiconductor kingdom, from authoritarian rule to democracy, from a six-day working week to a two-day weekend. On the day the index climbed back, what climbed back was not the Taiwan of 1990, but an entirely new Taiwan.
EpilogueWhat the Bubble Taught Us
A bubble is never a number. It is human nature. Everyone believes they are the clever one, and the mark of the clever one is "I will get out before the crash" — but on the day of 12,682, nobody got out. The clever believe they are different from everyone else; a bubble is a bubble precisely because everyone believes that.
Institutions amplify emotion. The price limit froze selling for nineteen sessions. A single margin-finance channel left leverage with nowhere to escape. The smaller the market, the louder the echo. A good system does not stop people from making mistakes; it stops one mistake from infecting everyone at once. Taiwan in 1990 had it exactly backwards.
The investors of 1990 did not lose to ignorance. They lost to "this time is different." Every bubble has brand-new reasons to prove this time is different: this time it is martial law ending, money ankle-deep, the Taiwan miracle. After every crash, the reasons all look the same.
Some bought at 2,485 and became winners thirty years later; some sold at 12,682 and became legends. But most people neither bought at the bottom nor sold at the top — they were ordinary people, in an extraordinary era, doing what ordinary people do.
12,682 is only a historical number now. But the question it left behind remains: when the next mountain appears, will we recognise it? Those who recognise it may not escape; those who escape may not recognise it. That is the hardest thing about a bubble — it never announces itself in advance. Afterwards, it leaves only one sentence behind: you knew all along.



